Abstract Iterated attacks are comprised of iterating adversaries who can make d plaintext queries, in each iteration to compute a bit, and are trying to distinguish between a random cipher C and the perfect cipher C * based on all bits. Vaudenay showed that a 2d-decorrelated cipher resists to iterated attacks of order d when iterations have almost no common queries. Then, he first asked what the necessary conditions are for a cipher to resist a non-adaptive iterated attack of order d. I.e., whether decorrelation of order 2d −1 could be sufficient. Secondly, he speculated that repeating a plaintext query in different iterations does not provide any advantage to a non-adaptive distinguisher. We close here these two long-standing open problems negatively. For those questions, we provide two counter-intuitive examples.W e also deal with adaptive iterated adversaries who can make both plaintext and ciphertext queries in which the future queries are dependent on the past queries. We show that decorrelation of order 2d protects against these attacks of order d. We also study the generalization of these distinguishers for iterations making non-binary outcomes. Finally, we measure the resistance against two well-known statistical distinguishers, namely, differential-linear and boomerang distinguishers and show that 4-decorrelation degree protects against these attacks.
Introduction
Unlike asymmetric cryptography, in which the security of a cryptosystem is provably reduced to a mathematical problem and guaranteed by an intractability assumption, the focus in symmetric cryptography is often statistical cryptanalysis and, in the absence of a successful attack, a cryptosystem is believed to be secure. For instance, once the crypto community has spent enough time scrutinizing a block cipher and has found no successful attacks against its full round version, the block cipher is believed to be secure. However, a different approach against block cipher cryptanalysis was pioneered by Nyberg [17] . She formalized the notion of strength against differential cryptanalysis. Her work was followed by Chabaud and Vaudenay [9] formalizing the notion of strength against linear cryptanalysis.
Decorrelation Theory, introduced by Vaudenay [22, 25] , encapsulates the techniques that guarantee the provable resistance of block ciphers against a wide range of statistical cryptanalysis, including the seminal differential and linear attacks, as well as their variants, for example the boomerang attack, truncated differential attacks, and impossible differential attacks. The beauty of this theory is that it can even guarantee resistance against some notyet-discovered attacks that meet a certain broad criteria in the model presented by Luby and Rackoff [14, 15] . They prove the security of Feistel schemes by assuming that the round function is random. However, their approach needs a very long secret key and is not suitable in practice. Carter and Wegman [7, 8] , on the other hand, use derandomization techniques for sampling pairwise independent numbers, which has inspired the notion of decorrelation in that it measures the pseudorandomness with smaller keys and examines its effects against the adversaries.
It is worth mentioning here that perfect decorrelation of order d is equivalent to d-wise independence [13] . Moreover, decorrelation of order d is also referred to as almost d-wise independence [1, 16] . Furthermore, the concept of decorrelation is somewhat related to the notion of pseudorandom functions and pseudorandom permutations except that we do not limit the time complexity of the distinguisher, but only the number of queries are restricted.
The adversaries considered here can query d plaintexts and receive their corresponding ciphertexts, but are unlimited in terms of computational power. When these plaintext/ciphertext pairs are chosen randomly and independently from each other, we are dealing with non-adaptive d-limited adversaries, as opposed to adaptive d-limited adversaries. These adversaries give rise to distinguishers of order d, whether adaptive or otherwise, who are trying to distinguish between a random cipher C and the perfect cipher C * .
More formally, to a random cipher C, we define a d-wise distribution matrix Several block ciphers have been designed, whose security is proven by decorrelation techniques, see for example DFC [18] , NUT (n-Universal Transformation) families of block ciphers [10, 19, 21, 25] . Using similar techniques, Baignères and Finiasz propose two provably secure block ciphers to use in practice called the block cipher C [3] and KFC [2] . Decorrelation Theory has been used in other results as well, see for instance [4, 20, [22] [23] [24] .
Vaudenay [25] shows how differential and linear attacks fit in the d-limited adversarial model by introducing iterated attacks, which are simply constructed by iterating a nonadaptive d-limited distinguisher (see Algorithm 3) . Linear and differential cryptanalysis can be formulated as non-adaptive iterated attacks of order 1 and order 2, respectively, and the boomerang attack is an adaptive (chosen plaintext and ciphertext) iterated attack of order Moreover, he computes a bound on the advantage of the d-limited adversaries by decorrelation techniques in the Luby-Rackoff model. This result is expressed in the following theorem.
Our contribution Firstly, we show that the decorrelation of order 2d − 1 is not sufficient. We achieve this by proposing a counterexample consisting of a 3-round Feistel cipher which is decorrelated to the order 2d − 1 and, yet, we are able to mount a successful non-adaptive iterated distinguisher of order d against it. Secondly, we propose another set of counterexamples where a higher probability of having common queries surprisingly increases the advantage of the distinguisher. In particular, we show that there is an iterated distinguisher of order 1 on a 2d-decorrelated cipher when the probability of having at least one query in common in any two iterations is high, which is counterintuitive.
As a second contribution, we concentrate on adaptive iterated distinguishers who can adaptively make plaintext and ciphertext queries. Allowing the adversary to make both plaintext and ciphertext queries extends the security model and has already appeared in the literature. Indeed, the boomerang attack [26] is an example of such an adversary. Studying these general distinguishers making adaptive plaintext-ciphertext queries allows us to, for example, interpret Wagner's boomerang attack [26] on COCONUT98 [19, 25] , a perfect 2-decorrelated block cipher and provably secure against differential and linear cryptanalyses and iterated attacks of order 1. Indeed, it could have resisted to Wagner's attack with a decorrelation of order 8.
A bound for the advantage of an adaptive iterated distinguisher of order d, who can make both plaintext and ciphertext queries has not been computed yet. The significance of studying these distinguishers is not hidden to anyone. Therefore, we prove the bound for the advantage of adaptive iterated distinguisher of order d against a 2d-decorrelated cipher. It comes with no surprise that using this metric, we get a looser, i.e., higher, upper bound for adaptive distinguishers than that for non-adaptive distinguishers (see Theorem 1) . We then generalize these distinguishers in a way that the outputs of iterations are not binary anymore, 
This theorem shows that, in order to resist a non-adaptive iterated attack of order d with seldom common queries, it is sufficient for a cipher to have the decorrelation of order 2d. However, whether or not this is a necessary condition has not been addressed. Moreover, the bound given in the theorem can be interpreted to imply that, perhaps, a high probability δ of having a common query increases the bound of the attack. Despite this hint, Vaudenay in his EUROCRYPT '99 paper [22] speculates that having the same query to the oracle does not provide any advantage, but whether or not this is true has been left open. We will settle both of these open questions.
take values from a set of integers, and prove the bound for this generalized version, as well.
Finally, we measure the resistance against two well-known statistical distinguishers, namely, differential-linear and boomerang distinguishers. We show that a cipher resisting these distinguishers needs to be exactly 4-decorrelated. These results are better than the results obtained in Theorems 1 and 5 since a cipher requires to be at most 4-decorrelated and 8-decorrelated according to these theorems, respectively. So, a 4-decorrelation of COCONUT98 would have been enough, actually, to defeat Wagner's attack.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives basics of Decorrelation Theory. We dedicate Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 to our main contributions.
Basics of Decorrelation Theory
In this paper, F denotes a random function (or equivalently a function set up with a random key) from M 1 to M 2 and F * denotes the ideal random function from M 1 to M 2 , that is, a function drawn uniformly at random among all |M 2 | |M 1 | functions on the given sets. Similarly, C denotes a random cipher (or equivalently, the encryption function set up with a random key) over M 1 and C * denotes the ideal random cipher over M 1 , that is, a permutation drawn uniformly at random among all |M 1 |! permutations. We use the following standard notations: |S| denotes the cardinality of the set S; M d is the set of all sequences of d tuples over the set M; GF(q) is the finite field with q elements; GF(q) [x] is the set of polynomials defined over GF(q); E(X) denotes the expected value of the random variable X; V (X) is the variance of the random variable X; gcd(p(x), q(x)) denotes the greatest common divisor of p(x) and q(x); and "⊕" denotes addition modulo 2.
We consider the Luby-Rackoff model [15] in which an adversary A is unbounded in terms of computational power. It is bounded to d number of plaintext/ciphertext queries to an oracle implementing a random function (resp. a random cipher). The goal of the adversary A is to guess whether this function (resp. cipher) is drawn following the distribution of F (resp. C) or of F * (resp. C * ). When queries are chosen randomly and at once, such an adversary is exactly a non-adaptive d-limited distinguisher. However, when queries are chosen depending on the answers to the previous queries, it is referred to as an adaptive dlimited distinguisher. In both distinguishers, the measure of success of A is computed by means of the advantage of the adversary.
Here, the maximum is taken over adversaries in a class ζ . For instance, ζ can consist of all non-adaptive or all adaptive d-limited distinguishers, denoted by A NA(d) and A A(d) , respectively, between F 0 and F 1 depending on A being non-adaptive or adaptive.
Decorrelation Theory has a link with Linear and Differential Cryptanalyses (see Algorithms 1 and 2) which are the essential cryptanalysis methods of both block ciphers and pseudorandom functions. Both methods have iterative analysis of an instance of a block Definition 1 Let F 0 and F 1 be two random functions. The advantage of an adversary A distinguishing F 0 from F 1 is defined by
Another measure is the best advantage of the distinguisher which is formulated as Briefly, a test T generates the binary output T i of each iteration i, and then the distinguisher outputs his final decision based on the acceptance set Acc and the tuple (T 1 , . . . , T n ). Linear and differential cryptanalyses are the examples for non-adaptive iterated attacks of order 1 and 2, respectively. Their combinations called differential-linear distinguishers, described in Algorithm 4, are non-adaptive iterated attacks of order 2. In addition, the boomerang attack is an adaptive iterated attack of order 4 (with chosen plaintexts and ciphertexts).
Algorithm 1 Linear distinguisher
Input: an integer n, a set X, a set I , masks a and b Oracle: an oracle implementing a permutation c 1: for i = 1 to n do 2: pick x 1 uniformly at random from X 3:
set
output 1 8: else 9: output 0 10: end if
Algorithm 2 Differential distinguisher
Input: an integer n, a set X, differences α and β Oracle: an oracle implementing a permutation c 1: for i = 1 to n do 2: pick x 1 uniformly at random over X 3:
set T i = 1 y 1 ⊕y 2 =β 6: end for 7: if T 1 + · · · + T n = 0 then 8: output 1 9: else 10: output 0 11: end if
We now recall two matrix-norms which are used in Decorrelation Theory.
Algorithm 3 A generic non-adaptive iterated distinguisher of order d
Input: an integer n, a set X, a distribution X on X, a test T , a set Acc Oracle: an oracle implementing a permutation c 1:
Algorithm 4 Differential-linear distinguisher
Input: an integer n, a set X, a set I , masks a and b, differences α and β Oracle: an oracle implementing a permutation c 1: for i = 1 to n do 2: pick x 1 uniformly at random over X 3:
output 1 9: else 10: output 0 11: end if
The use of these matrix-norms depends on the type of attacks. The first norm which is known as L ∞ -matrix-norm is used for non-adaptive distinguishers, while the second matrix-norm which is called the adaptive matrix-norm or · A -matrix-norm by Vaudenay [23] , is for adaptive distinguishers. The reasonings are obvious as the former matrix-norm maximizes the sum over all input tuples when they are chosen at once, while the latter one maximizes the sum according to the inputs which are chosen dependently on the previous inputs. We now recall a fundamental notion of Decorrelation Theory, the d-wise distribution matrix of a random function or a random permutation.
Intuitively, a distribution matrix of an arbitrary function F (resp. cipher C) helps to analyze the function and show how far it is from its ideal version F * (resp. C * ). Mainly, the distribution of (F (x 1 ) 
Furthermore, Luby and Rackoff prove the security of a 3-round Feistel scheme when the round functions are perfect functions as follows. 
Lastly, Theorem 1 provides a bound for the advantage of a distinguisher against random permutations. We provide the following theorem for the case of random functions which proves a a tighter bound for the advantage. 
Theorem 4 Let
Proof This proof is exactly the same as the proof of Theorem 1 [25] except for the computation of V (T (F * )) which results in a tighter bound for the distinguisher. Given F = f (resp. F * = f ), let T (f ) be the probability that test function T outputs 1 when
, where X is input to the oracle. Let p (resp. p * ) be the probability that the distinguisher outputs 1, i.
where Acc is the acceptance set and T i (F ) (resp. T i (F * )) is the output of iteration i. As T i (f )'s are all independent once f is fixed and have the same expected value T (f ), we get
Then, p can be rewritten as
for some integers a i such that 0 ≤ a i ≤ n i . Therefore, the advantage |p − p * | is maximal when all a i 's are either 0 or n i depending on the distributions T (F ) and T (F * ). This implies that the acceptance set of the best distinguisher is of the form
Notice that, as the sum over all i, such that 0 ≤ i ≤ n, is the derivative of (x + (1 − x)) n , the total sum is zero. Hence, we get
Notice that when x ≥ 1/2, we have |s (x)| ≤ 2n. Similarly, when x < 1/2, we have |s (x)| ≤ 2n. Thus, we obtain |s (x)| ≤ 2n, for every x. So, according to the Mean Value Theorem, we have
According to Theorem 2, we have
By applying Tchebichev's inequality for both T (F ) and T (F * ) which is
We have
. Up to this point, the proof was the same with the proof of Theorem 1. However, the bound for V (T (F * )) is different from the bound for V (T (C * )), where C * is the perfect cipher. We get V (T (F * )) to be equal to
In order to bound this sum, we divide pairs of iterations (x, x ) into two groups such that the first group has no common queries, i.e. ∀i, j x i = x j , but the second one has. As a remark, we assume that the adversary does not pick the same query in a single iteration, i.e.
When inputs x and x have no common queries, then
Therefore, when input tuples x and x have no common queries, the sum will be 0. Otherwise, when the plaintext tuples x and x have common queries with probability δ, then the sum over all these plaintext tuples will be less than δ. Hence, we have V (T (F * )) ≤ δ. When we substitute δ for V (T (F * )) in the inequality in Line (1), we get
Two followings are useful for the rest of the paper.
Definition 4
The trace Tr(β) of an element β ∈ GF(2 k ), is defined as
Note that it is well known that the trace is linear and the trace of an element of GF(2 k ) is either 0 or 1. [11] ): Let X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n be independent random variables and 0
Lemma 1 (Hoeffding's bound
≤ X i ≤ 1, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. DefineX = 1 n n i=0 X i and let μ = E(X). Then, for ε, 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1 − μ, we have Pr[X ≥ E(X) + ε] ≤ e −2nε 2 and Pr[X ≤ E(X) − ε] ≤ e −2nε 2 .
In addition, two-sided Hoeffding's bound is stated by
Pr[|X − E(X)| ≥ ε] ≤ 2e −2nε 2 .
Definition 5
Let S be the sample space and E ⊆ S be an event. The indicator function of the event E, denoted by 1 E , is a random variable defined as
The indicator function can shortly be denoted as 1 E instead of 1 E (s).
In the sequel, we concentrate on the solutions of two aforementioned open problems.
Addressing the two open problems
We deal with two open problems in Decorrelation Theory. In [25] , Vaudenay proposes Theorem 1 proving that the decorrelation of order 2d is sufficient for a cipher in order to resist a non-adaptive iterated attack of order d. We show here that the decorrelation of order 2d − 1 is not sufficient by providing a counterexample. Secondly, the same theorem can be interpreted to imply that probability of having common queries increases the bound of the attack. To see the effect of this probability, we provide another counterexample showing that when this probability is high, the advantage of the distinguisher can be high as well.
A 3-round Feistel scheme
We create a three round Feistel scheme C to be used in the following two subsections. This cipher C consists of three perfect κ-decorrelated functions F 1 , F 2 , and
Each F i is defined by
Notice that this theorem bounds the advantage which is half of the decorrelation distance.
Decorrelation of order 2d − 1 is NOT sufficient
In this section, we put forward a counterexample on the 3-round Feistel cipher C defined in the previous section, which is decorrelated to the order κ = 2d − 1. This implies that
We provide a successful nonadaptive iterated distinguisher of order d against C showing that the decorrelation of order 2d − 1 is not enough to resist a non-adaptive iterated distinguisher of order d.
We first start with explaining the input distribution that the adversary uses. Let 
where all c i 's, except c 1 , are previously chosen constants and x L i 's are pairwise distinct. The left half of these inputs is chosen by Algorithm 5. 
Elaborating Algorithm 5 Given d and c
and gcd(g(x), g (x)) = 1 7: find the roots (x 1 , . . . , x d ) of g(x) by using a factorization algorithm for polynomials 8:
Consider the encryption of each round when x i 's are satisfying the above properties. After the first round, we have 0 (x L i + F 1 (0)). Then, the output of the second round encryption is (
However, we will only be interested in the right part of the ciphertext, i.e. y R i , which can be seen as the output of a random polynomial function of degree at most 2d − 2. More explicitly, as As we use the input distribution defined above, we can get some fixed bits by interpolating the function F , the right part of the output of the cipher. In more detail, in every iteration we interpolate a polynomial r, which will appear in the equation in Line (2). We expect that for the perfect function F * the constant coefficient of the polynomial r would be random, but for F it would be fixed. We prove this in Lemma 2. After formally writing this argument, by defining the test function T and the acceptance set Acc, we can distinguish the cipher from its ideal counterpart with only two iterations.
The distinguisher has d plaintext-ciphertext pairs in each iteration and F is indeed a polynomial. Moreover, we know d points on F and we then use the underdetermined interpolation technique to determine F . We write F such that F (x) = a 2d−2 x 2d−2 + a 2d−3 x 2d−3 + · · · + a 0 over GF(q), then we can write F as
Here, r is a unique polynomial of degree at most d − 1 which interpolates d given points, s is a polynomial of degree at most d − 2 over GF(q) and g is a polynomial of degree d with the
where h is a fixed polynomial of degree d with zero coefficient for the term x.
The aim is to get some fixed bits related to the function F in each iteration to have a distinguisher. The following lemma shows that, when the input is picked according to Algorithm 5, the constant coefficient r 0 of polynomial r is fixed in each iteration.
Lemma 2 Let F be the polynomial of degree at most
be the left half of the plaintexts generated by Algorithm 5 and
the constant coefficient r 0 of the polynomial r, which is obtained by the Lagrange interpolation of the given d points, is fixed in each iteration. Proof We write g(x)
Polynomial 1 has degree at most d − 1 and Polynomial 2 has at least degree d (the degree of h), unless s(x) = s (x). Therefore, in order to have zero on the right side of the equation, s(x) − s (x) has to be zero. This shows that the polynomial s is a fixed polynomial, i.e. independent from the plaintext tuple that is queried. Therefore, we can write F as
, for fixed polynomials s and h and for some c 1 ∈ GF(q). Hence, when x = 0, we have F (0) = r(0) + s(0)h(0) which implies that r 0 = a 0 − s 0 h 0 is always fixed.
We can now deduce that r 0 is always fixed and independent from the plaintext tuples due to the carefully chosen plaintext tuples. Now, we use Lemma 2 to construct a distinguisher between C and C * . We denote the derived value of r 0 as a function f ((x 1 , . . . , x d ), (y 1 , . . . , y d ) ). Let D be a subset of distinguished values of GF(q) with a given cardinality q/μ, where μ > 1 is a positive divisor of q. Define the test function as T ((x 1 , . . . , x d ), (y 1 , . . . , y d ) 
and the acceptance set as
All iterations will reply the same answer for the function F and a random answer for F * . Let p (resp. p * ) be the probability that the distinguisher outputs 1 when it is fed with F (resp. F * ). Hence, according to the acceptance set defined above, we get p = Illustration of the attack for d = 2 We consider the Feistel scheme for κ = 3 over GF(p k ) which makes the write half of the output y R a random polynomial F (x) = F 2 (x + F 1 (0)) of degree at most 2. The input distribution is chosen as (
The adversary will notice that a 1 is fixed for F in every iteration while it is random for a truly random cipher F * . For this attack two iterations are enough to carry out the attack.
3.3 Assuming a low δ is NECESSARY Theorem 1 shows that if a cipher is decorrelated to the order 2d, then it resists to an iterated attack of order d. Moreover, it is speculated that a high probability δ of having a common query does not provide any advantage to the adversary. However, we give a counterintuitive example showing that there is an iterated distinguisher of order 1 on a 2d-decorrelated cipher when the probability of having at least one query in common in any two iterations is high. This shows that introducing this probability δ in Theorem 1 is necessary.
In our distinguisher, we use C, depicted in Fig. 1 , for κ = 2d and q = 2 k which has the property that
A ≤ 8d 2 /2 k due to Theorem 3. We are going to prove that C is not resisting an iterated attack of order 1 when the set of plaintexts of adversary's choice is small. Let S be a set of plaintexts S = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x 2d+2 }, where Proof First, we recall the Newton formulas. Let f be a polynomial of the form f (x) = x n + a n−1 x n−1 + a n−2 x n−2 + · · · + a 2 x 2 + a 1 x + a 0 with the roots x i = −a n−1 , 1≤i<j ≤n
x i x j = a n−2 ,
1≤i<j <k≤n
GF(2 k ).
How to generate the left part of the plaintexts in S is provided in Algorithm 6. In each iteration, we pick one element of S at random. As the adversary's choice of input set has 2d + 2 elements, we have δ = 1/(2d + 2).
Analyzing Algorithm 6
This algorithm finds p(x) = x 2d+2 +ax 2 +bx +c with distinct roots
This is proved in Lemma 3 when n = 2d + 2. The expected number of iterations in the algorithm can be computed heuristically as
!, that is, one over the probability that a random monic polynomial of degree 2d + 2 has 2d + 2 distinct roots in GF(2 k ). As there are 2 k possible irreducible factors of degree 1 in GF(2 k )[x], we compute their 2d + 2 possible combinations 2 k 2d+2 to construct polynomials of degree 2d +2 and we divide it by the total number of monic polynomials of degree 2d +2 which is 2 k(2d+2) .
Lemma 3
Let f be a polynomial of the form f (x) = x n + a n−1 x n−1 + a n−2 x n−2 + · · · + a 2 x 2 +a 1 x+a 0 over GF(2 k ) and x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n be its roots. If a n−1 = a n−2 = · · · = a 3 = 0, then its roots satisfy
In addition, the kth power sums of the roots are defined as s k = 1≤i≤n x k i . Then, Newton formulas give recursion relations between a i 's and s i 's as
. . . , s n + a n−1 s n−1 + a n−2 s n−2 + · · · + na 0 = 0, s n+1 + a n−1 s n−1 + a n−2 s n−2 + · · · + s 1 a 0 = 0.
Note that Newton formulas are valid over finite fields. If we assume that a n−1 = a n−2 = · · · = a 3 = 0, then according to the Newton formulas given above we will show that s k = 0 for 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 3. As s 1 + a 1 = 0 and a 1 = 0, we have s 1 = 0. By induction, assume that s 1 = s 2 = · · · = s k−1 = 0 and a n−1 = a n−2 = · · · = a n−k = 0, then we have s k = −(a n−1 s k−1 + a n−2 s k−2 + · · · + ka n−k ) = 0. Therefore, the polynomial
Algorithm 6
Generating the left half of the plaintexts in S
pick a, b, c ∈ GF(2 k ) at random and construct p(x) = x 2d+2 + ax 2 + bx + c 5: until x 2 k ≡ x mod p(x) and gcd(p(x), p (x)) = 1 6: find the roots (x 1 , . . . , x 2d+2 ) of p(x) by using a factorization algorithm for polynomials 7: return (x 1 , . . . , x 2d+2 ) Like in Section 3.2, in order to distinguish this cipher C from the perfect cipher C * , we distinguish the right half of the output of the cipher which is itself a random function of the form F (x) = a 2d−1 x 2d−1 + a 2d−2 x 2d−2 + · · · + a 0 over GF(q).
To explain how the distinguisher works briefly, when we consider that the plaintext space has the special form mentioned before, the polynomial F can be distinguished by using the trace (see Definition 4). This is because, by the following Lemma, the sum of the trace of all elements of S behaves differently when F is considered than when F * is considered. Now, the following lemma proves this distinguishing property of F .
Lemma 4 Let F be a random function and S be the input set defined as above. For
Which is equal to 0 due the linearity of trace, the characteristic of this field being two, and Tr(0) = 0.
Lemma 4 implies that there is an even number of F (x L i )'s which satisfy the property that
Tr(F (x L i )) = 0 and the characteristic of this field is zero. Now, we explain how the iterated distinguisher of order 1 with n iterations works, where the input is distributed independently and identically over the set S. We use the property of the polynomial function F which is stated in Lemma 4 in a way that in each iteration, we pick a plaintext x from S at random and compute the trace of F (x L ), i.e. t = Tr(F (x L )) being F (x L ) = y R . Then, we compute the averageT = 1 n (t 1 + · · · + t n ), where t i is the output of iteration i. We decide whether the oracle implements F (equivalently C) or F * (equivalently C * ) by simply checking that the average valueT is in the specified set K which is determined according to the expected values of bothT andT * given in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 Let S have the aforementioned property. Then, depending on S, the expected value ofT takes any value from the set S
, and that of T * takes any value from the set S 2 = {m/(2d + 2)|0 ≤ m ≤ 2d + 2} . Lemma 4) . Then, the number of x i 's satisfying Tr(F (x L i )) = 1 in n iterations is expected to be n(2m)/(2d + 2), where 0 ≤ m ≤ d + 1. Therefore, the expected value of T will be 2m/(2d + 2), where 0 ≤ m ≤ d + 1. In a similar way, we can find the expected value of E(T * ) for the perfect function F * . Now, using Lemma 5, we define the acceptance set as
Proof Assume that there are 2m number of
Typically, ε = 1/(4d +4). Let p (resp. p * ) be the probability that the distinguisher outputs 1 when it is fed with F (resp. F * ). The following lemma states the bounds for both p and p * . 
Lemma 6 The probabilities of the distinguisher outputs 1 when C is considered and

Pr[E(T ) = x] Pr[T ∈ K|E(T ) = x].
As Pr[T ∈ K|E(T ) = x] ≥ 1 − 2e −2nε 2 by Hoeffding's bound from Lemma 1, we have p ≥ 1 − 2e −2nε 2 . Similarly, p * is computed as
The computation of p * is not straightforward; hence, we first compute the probability that each expected value ofT * from S 2 occurs with probability Pr[E(
. In detail, we are picking x(2d + 2) places for 1's among 2d + 2 possible places and dividing the total number of possible choices which is 2 2d+2 . Furthermore, the probabilities Pr[T * ∈ K|E(T * ) = x] are different according to the expected value of differentT * . When E(T * ) = 2m/(2d + 2) for 0 
Note that the sum of even and odd indices of binomial coefficients are i≥0 n 2i = 2 n−1 and i≥0 n 2i+1 = 2 n−1 , respectively. Hence, we have
Then, we get
Therefore, we get p * ≤ 1 2 + e −2nε 2 .
Finally, the advantage of the distinguisher is
When the distinguisher has a large number of iterations, we have |p − p * | ≈ 1/2 which is quite high. This way we manage to distinguish the cipher C from the ideal random cipher C * . When the distinguisher has a large number of iterations, we have |p − p * | ≈ 1/2 which is quite high. This way, we manage to distinguish the cipher C from the perfect cipher C * . Hence, in specific situations, having common queries can increase the advantage. Essentially, if the images of 2d + 2 points sum to zero, by taking ε = 1/(4d + 4) and n ≈ (d 2 ), we obtain an efficient iterated distinguisher of order 1. As a final remark, in Decorrelation Theory, Vaudenay considers block ciphers in the context of deterministic symmetric-key encryption. Therefore, for some input distribution, the probability δ that two iterations have at least one query in common can be high. However, if we consider probabilistic symmetric-key encryption, then δ will always be small. This is because, in this scheme, the oracle picks the random coins, and even if the same plaintext is picked by the adversary, the random coins picked by the oracle for two plaintexts would be different which cause two different inputs to the encryption.
Illustration of the attack for d = 1 We consider the Feistel scheme for κ = 2 over GF(2 k ). Hence, the write half of the output y R becomes a random polynomial F (x) = F 2 (x +F 1 (0)) of degree at most 1. The attacker picks the set of plaintexts S = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 } in a way that 
Resistance against adaptive iterated distinguishers
As mentioned before, we explore the maximum success of the adaptive iterated distinguishers.
Adaptive plaintext-ciphertext iterated distinguishers of order d
We recall two generic distinguishers, namely an adaptive plaintext-ciphertext d-limited distinguisher (see Algorithm 7) and an adaptive plaintext-ciphertext iterated distinguisher of order d (see Algorithm 8) . Both distinguishers are adaptive in a way that the adversary adaptively asks for both encryption and decryption of the queries. Herein we formalize these distinguishers.
We first define a compact function G to be distinguished. The goal of defining this function is that the input to the oracle is able to be specified being either encrypted or decrypted (as the adversary makes either the plaintext queries or the ciphertext queries in a specific order depending on his type of attack).
Let G be the set of functions G such that G : M × {0, 1} → M satisfying G (G(x, 0), 1) = x and G(G(x, 1) , 0) = x, for all x. We denote G 0 (x) = G(x, 0) and 1) and point out G 
An adaptive d-limited distinguisher
The adversary A A(d) , detailed in Algorithm 7, has access to an oracle which implements either an instance of G or an instance of G * , such that functions G 0 and G 1 perform encryption and decryption, respectively. He picks a random coin r from {0, 1} * according to a given distribution R and queries a function F which is fed with r and the output of the previous queries (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v i−1 ) , where v k = (u k )
Algorithm 7 A generic adaptive plaintext-ciphertext d-limited distinguisher
Input: a function F , a test T , a distribution R on {0, 1} * Oracle: an oracle implementing either an instance of G or an instance of G * 1: pick r ∈ {0, 1} * at random from R 2:
for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , i − 1}, and 1 ≤ i ≤ d. He then receives a new query u i . He sends this input u i to the oracle to receive the output v i , where -as explained-v i = (u i ). Finally, using a test T , he outputs a decision bit "1" if he guesses that implements an instance of the random function G, or "0" if he guesses that implements an instance of the perfect function G * .
Algorithm 8 A generic adaptive plaintext-ciphertext iterated distinguisher of order d
Input: an integer n, a function F , a test T , a set Acc, a distribution R on {0, 1} * Oracle: an oracle implementing a function G or G * 1: for k = 1 to n do 2: set T k (with independent coins) ← output of Distinguisher in The adversary queries two (chosen) plaintexts and receives their corresponding ciphertexts, he then constructs two ciphertexts depending on the previous ciphertexts and asks for their decryption. The adaptively chosen queries to the oracle in each iteration of the boomerang attack [26] can be written as (u 1 
, where x 1 is selected uniformly at random over the set X, and and ∇ denote non-zero differences.
Advantage of adaptive plaintext-ciphertext iterated distinguishers of order d
Vaudenay [25] found a bound for the advantage of non-adaptive iterated distinguishers of order d, which is not applicable to the adaptive adversaries. We extend his result and provide
Algorithm 9 Boomerang distinguisher
Input: an integer n, a set X, differences and ∇ Oracle: an oracle implementing a permutation c 1: for k = 1 to n do 2: pick x 1 uniformly at random over X 3:
set T k = 1 x 3 ⊕x 4 = 8: end for 9: if T 1 + · · · + T n = 0 then 10: output 1 11: else 12: output 0 13: end if a bound for the advantage of adaptive plaintext-ciphertext iterated distinguishers of order d. Strictly speaking, we compute the maximum success of the adversary who is making d adaptive queries to the oracle in each iteration to distinguish a 2d-decorrelated random cipher upon using the · A norm. Algorithm 6) . Then, the advantage
Theorem 5 Let
where θ is the probability that any two different iterations have at least one query in common.
Proof Let one iteration consist of the input queries u = (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u d ) and the output
We first make two conventional assumptions about the adaptive adversary.
Assumption 1: Inner-collisions in input queries, i.e. u i = u j , are not allowed, as calling the same query twice in the same iteration will not give any advantage to the adversary. Notice that these assumptions do not hold between different iterations.
We begin similarly to the proof of Theorem 1 provided in [25] . We first define T (g) to
We now define a new random variable T 2 (G) which is the output of another test with 2d entries, that is,
Thanks to Theorem 2, we have |E
To obtain the result in Line (5), we use
Afterwards, the advantage of the distinguisher is
By applying Tchebichev's inequality for both T (G) and T (G * ), i.e.
Pr[|T (G) − E G (T (G))| > λ] ≤ V (T (G))/λ 2 and Pr[|T (G
Note that s maps the elements of [0, 1] to [0, 1], Line (6) is due to Inequality (4). We have 2) )/n. So far, everything works similarly to [25] . However, the rest is different as the function implemented in the oracle has new properties. For further details of the proof up to now, refer to [25] . Now, it is left to bound V (T (G * )).
Bounding V (T (G * )) We now bound V (T (G * )) by expanding it as
V (T (G
where S = (v, r), (v , r ) ∈ T and u (resp. u ) is defined by both r and v (resp. r and v ). For the sake of simplicity, we denote inside the sum in Line (9) as P . We first divide the expression in Line (9) into two disjoint sums depending on whether or not u and u (from two different iterations) are colliding, i.e. if there exist i and j such that u i = u j with u and u defined from (v, r) and (v , r ), respectively. In detail, we have
We now bound each sum separately. The sum S 1 P over S 1 is bounded as
Here, we denote
by θ . This can be interpreted as the probability that any two different iterations have at least one query in common. Notice that the sum v,v 1
Now, we provide a bound for the sum S 2 P over S 2 which is for non-colliding inputs u and u . We first note that, as both G * 0 and G * 1 are from M to M, and, hence, bijective, they are indeed a uniformly distributed permutation C * . From now on, we use the notation C * for both G * 0 and G * 1 . We define x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x d ) and y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y d ) as
is its corresponding output tuple. This is basically collecting the plaintexts and ciphertexts into two separate tuples. Now, the sum over S 2 can be rewritten into three disjoint sums as
A.
Here, S 3 , S 4 and S 5 are the three partitions of S 2 , i.e. S 2 = S 3 ∪ S 4 ∪ S 5 , where
, and A is
and P are the same but written in different ways. We now deal with these three sums.
The sum S 3 A over S 3 (all non-colliding u's and u 's, all non-colliding x's and x 's, and all non-colliding y's and y 's) can be rewritten as
Here, as Pr
there is no collision between x and x and between y and y , in the equality Line (12), we take it out from the sum. Afterwards, as we never have a i = v j and b i = b j according to Assumption 2, there will not be any inner-collisions in x. Therefore, when x i = x j and y i = y j for all i and j , we have
and
Then, we have
2 . Now, we bound the equality in Line (12) as
Note that the inequality in Line (13) is due to fact that the sum in Line (12) is bounded by the total number of v and v which is M 2d and P 1 ≥ P 2 2 . In order to prove the inequality in Line (14), we rewrite it as
We use two inequalities such that (1 − 1/x) −1 ≤ 1 + 2/x when |x| ≥ 2, which holds for x = M as M ≥ 2 (according to the statement of Theorem 5) and (1 + r/k) k ≤ e r , when 1 + r/k ≥ 0, then, the upper bound is
In addition, we get
by using geometric series formula, i.e.
Hence, we get the desired upper bound for the expre Furthermore, the sum over S 4 ,
A, will be the sum over all colliding y's and y 's, all non-colliding x's and x 's, and all non-colliding u's and u 's. When x and x are non-colliding, it is not possible to have colliding y and y . Hence, we have Pr C * (x, x ) C * − → (y, y ) = 0. Therefore, the sum over S 4 will be negative, i.e.
Finally, we provide a bound for the sum S 5 , S 5 A, as
Here, we define
to be the probability that x and x collide when there is no collision between u and u . We find γ ≤ d 2 /M as follows. There is only one way for x and x to collide when there is no collision between u and u . This happens when a same query is from both u (resp. u ) and v (resp. v). In detail, let u i = (a i , b i ) and u j = (a j , b j ) be two respective entries from u and u , and v i and v j be their corresponding output. When b i = 0, b j = 1 and a i = v j , then there is a collision in x and x such that x i = x j . As u and v are independent, the probability that u and v collide is less than d 2 /2M. Similarly, we have the same result for u and v. Now, if we sum up all the results given in Lines (10), (14), (15) and (17), then we have
When we substitute V (T (G * )) in Line (8), then we have
Allowing θ ≈ δ to compare Theorem 1 with Theorem 5, we observe that the bound for adaptive attacks is higher than the bound for non-adaptive attacks. This fact comes with no surprise. Adaptive adversaries are stronger than non-adaptive adversaries, in general, and adaptive queries can provide the adversary with some advantages.
Some important remarks
It is worth mentioning that Theorem 5 of Section 4.2 poses two questions. Not surprisingly, similar questions were posed by Theorem 1 and we answered these questions in Section 3 by providing two counterexamples that are not intuitive. These counter-intuitive examples can also be applied to the adaptive case since the Feistel ciphers used in the solution to both questions are decorrelated by the adaptive norm, and non-adaptive attacks are a subset of adaptive attacks.
Generalization of adaptive iterated distinguishers
Adaptive plaintext-ciphertext iterated distinguishers can be generalized in a way that the distinguisher in each iteration produces an information T i which is not binary, that is, it takes values from a finite set {1, 2, . . . , k} . Here, we find a bound for these generalized distinguishers as follows. 
Proof Let us define T j (g) = Pr[T i = j ] for j = 1, . . . , k, where T i denotes the output of iteration i. As in Theorem 5, the advantage of the distinguisher will be
We write
Let us define the hybrid as
where
. We obtain
The inequality in Line (20) is same as the result in Line (4). Furthermore, the advantage of the distinguisher is
The inequality in Line (21) is analogous to Line (7). In order to prove inequality in Line (22), we consider another distinguisher with a single iteration such that its test function outputs 1 when
which is defined previously in Section 4 for binary-valued test functions. Therefore, we can replace T j (g) by T (g). Finally, by substituting the value of V (T (G * )), found in the proof of Theorem 5, in to Line (22) , we obtain the desired result.
Resistance against well-known statistical distinguishers
In this section, we analyze two well-known statistical distinguishers , namely boomerang and differential-linear distinguishers, in the context of Decorrelation Theory. and provide security results dedicated for these attacks which improve the general result of Theorem 5. More explicitly, we here measure the highest success of an adversary with the need of the decorrelation distance of a cipher to the perfect cipher. Although, computing this distance is not practical for most of the block ciphers, it is a remarkable step in terms of provable security of block ciphers against these distinguishers. We show that having the decorrelation of order 4 protects ciphers against these attacks.
Differential-linear distinguishers
Differential-linear distinguishers, introduced by Langford and Hellman [12] , are the combination of two seminal cryptanalysis techniques, namely differential and linear cryptanalysis. Basically, the adversary considers the cipher as a cascade of two sub-ciphers such that he uses a truncated differential characteristics for a sub-cipher and a linear approximation for the other sub-cipher. The attack is described in Algorithm 4.
The adversary aims at finding an efficient distinguisher with high differential-linear probability (DLP) which is defined by
where α, b ∈ {0, 1} m , m ≥ 1, and c is an instance of a block cipher C which is defined on a message space {0, 1} m with cardinality M = 2 m , X is random variable on {0, 1} m . In order to express differential probability in another way, we notice that
and, we get
where X 1 and X 3 are independent and uniformly distributed random variables. We obtain the average DLP as
For the computation of E C (DLP C (α, b)) given above, we first divide the sums into two groups. The first group considers the terms x 1 = x 3 (which implies that x 2 = x 4 , y 1 = y 3 and y 2 = y 4 ) whose contribution is M −1 . The second group is when x 1 = x 3 and y 1 = y 3 (which implies x 2 = x 4 and y 2 = y 4 ). We can split this group into four sums according to the two bits
, when x 1 = x 3 and y 1 = y 3 . Then, we have
The sum of four sums is 0,0 + 0,1 + 1,0 + 1,1 = 2 m (2 m − 1). Therefore, we have
Notice that in (23) we use the fact that 1,0 = 0,1 . Notice that the expression in Line (23), we use the fact that 1,0 = 0,1 . Now, we compute E C * (DLP C * (α, b)) for using later in the proof of advantage of differential-linear distinguishers. We need to compute the sum 0,1 which can be divided into two following cases. Therefore, we obtain the expected DLP for C * as
.
Proof Similar to Lemma 15 in [25] .
Proof Similar to Lemma 16 in [25] .
This result is from Theorem 2. When iterated attacks have only one iteration, for example, for 2-limited attacks, the advantage will be bounded by the 2-decorrelation degree. However, due to the DLP which contains four inputs due to squaring of the probability, we consider the 4-decorrelation degree here. By using the previous lemma, we get the desired result. Figure 4 , outputs 1. We let p 0 be probability that it outputs 1 when the counter is incremented with probability 
Lemma 7 Let p(c) be the probability that differential-linear distinguisher, depicted in
Boomerang distinguishers
We bound the advantage of conventional boomerang distinguishers (see Algorithm 9) . Although it is proven in Theorem 5 that in order to resist to the boomerang attack, a cipher needs to be 8-decorrelated. When we compute this bound specifically for the boomerang distinguisher, we show that the 4 decorrelation degree is enough. This is not surprising because a similar result has been found for differential distinguishers. Vaudenay proves in [25] that if a cipher is decorrelated to the order 2, it can resist to differential attacks although Theorem 1 says that decorrelation degree of 4 might be necessary.
Theorem 8 Let C be a random cipher over the message space M with |M| = M ≥ 2, and C * be the perfect cipher. The advantage of the boomerang distinguisher, Adv Boo , depicted in Figure 9 , is
Proof First of all, let us define the differential probability of the boomerang distinguisher as DP where and ∇ are two strings denoting the input and the output non-zero differences, respectively. Here, DP c Boo ( , ∇) is defined with a fixed key, that is, it is defined for an instance c of C. In order to generalize this for any key, we consider its expected value (average value) as Now, let us define p(c) be the probability that the distinguisher outputs 1 for a fixed key (when C = c) which is
when the distinguisher has n iterations. We compute the probability p (resp. p * ) that the distinguisher outputs 1 which is p = E C (p(C)) (resp. p * = E C * (p(C * ))). From the expression in Line (24), we have p(c) ≤ n DP c Boo ( , ∇)) which implies that p ≤ n E C DP C Boo ( , ∇) . Furthermore, E C * DP C * Boo ( , ∇) can be found as follows. Note that the case where x 1 = x 3 results zero in the sum since it implies y 1 = y 3 which contradicts that ∇ is nonzero.
By combining the results found in Entries (a) and (b), we have
which implies that p * ≤ n(2M − 5)/(M − 1)(M − 3). Therefore, we have
As the value E C DP C Boo ( , ∇) is not known for a random cipher, we write it in terms of the values that we know. Hence, we consider the case when n = 1 and then we switch to the general case. As the boomerang distinguisher is a 4-limited adaptive distinguisher when there is only one iteration, we know from Theorem 2 that
When n = 1, we also have
By combining the inequality in Line (26) and the equality in Line (27), we get
A .
For the case n, we have the desired result according to the inequality in Line (25) .
Notice that E C * (DLP C * (α, b)) = E C * (DP C * Boo ( , ∇)). This is not surprising, a similar result appears in differential and linear attacks (see [25] ), as well.
Conclusions
We settled an open problem and disproved a claim, both of which are raised by the EURO-CRYPT '99 work of Vaudenay in Decorrelation Theory. In particular, we proved that in order for a cipher C to resist a non-adaptive iterated attack of order d, it is not sufficient to have a decorrelation of order 2d − 1. We showed this by providing a cipher decorrelated to the order 2d − 1 and a successful non-adaptive iterated attack against it which has order d. Hence, we concluded that the minimal order of decorrelation to ensure resistance is 2d. Furthermore, we illustrated that when the probability of having a common query between different iterations increases, the advantage of the distinguisher can increase.
In this work, we also study the resistance against adaptive plaintext-ciphertext iterated distinguishers of order d which has not been explored before. We prove the bound for this distinguisher in which the adversary is making adaptive plaintext and ciphertext queries to the oracle depending on the previous queries. This work contributes to proving the security of previous and future designs based on Decorrelation Theory since, previously, there was no clue with adaptive iterated adversaries in this context. We then generalize these distinguishers and obtain a bound for the advantage of them.
Finally, we investigate boomerang and differential-linear distinguishers.
